الفهرس 
Chapter One: General Framework of the ResearchOnly 14 pages are availabe for public view
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Abstract
The effect of ownership structure on firm performance is considered as an important subject that interests many researchers. According to the agency theory, there is a conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (principals and agents); this conflict of interests arises as a result of the separation of ownership and control. The literature on corporate governance presents a number of mechanisms to offset this agency problem and ensure that agency costs are minimized. This research focused on management ownership as a basic internal mechanism of effective corporate governance. The aim of this research is to examine the effect of management ownership on firm financial performance for 91 non-financial Egyptian firms listed in the Egyptian stock market for the fiscal year 2012. Management ownership was measured as the percentage of shares owned by members of board of directors in the firm. Firm financial performance was measured using return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q. In addition of using two control variables which are firm size and financial leverage.
SPSS software was used to analyze the empirical study data; through using descriptive statistics, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Pearson correlation coefficients, Spearman correlation coefficients, and multiple regression analysis. The empirical results found a significant non-linear (Quadratic) relationship between management ownership and firm financial performance. Also, the results found a significant positive relationship between management ownership and firm financial performance measured by ROA and ROE. Moreover, the results found a significant positive relationship between management ownership and firm financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q for values of management ownership exceeding approximately 7%.