الفهرس 
INTRODUCTIONOnly 14 pages are availabe for public view
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Abstract
Nuclear Security as defined by the IAEA, is the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The backbone of the nuclear security achievements is the physical protection system PPS which is defined as that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents, and to safeguard against sabotage, damage, and theft.Once a PPS is designed, it must be analyzed and evaluated to ensure it meets the physical protection objectives. Due to the complexity of the PPS, an evaluation usually requires modeling techniques, The physical protection system effectiveness along a specific path is defined as the product of two probabilities, The probability of interruption PI , which is calculated by using multi-path analysis modeling (Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion program SAVI), and The probability of neutralization PN, which is measured by the neutralization module. In this work we presenting a systematic methodology for PPS, design, analysis and evaluation and improving the effectiveness of the existing PPS system by upgrading its measures, and then measuring the associated risk before and after upgrading by using Entropy, in order to get a tangible result of upgrading the security system.